A&N Seaways and Projects PVT Ltd v Allianz Bulk Carriers DMCC [2025] EWHC 2126 (Comm) (13 August 2025) [ Home ] [ Databases ] [ World Law ] [ Multidatabase Search ] [ Help ] [ Feedback ] [ DONATE ] England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> A&N Seaways and Projects PVT Ltd v Allianz Bulk Carriers DMCC [2025] EWHC 2126 (Comm) (13 August 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2025/2126.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 2126 (Comm) [ New search ] [ Printable PDF version ] [ Help ] Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 2126 (Comm) Case No.: LM-2025-000013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES LONDON CIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996 Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL 13 August 2025 B e f o r e : HIS HONOUR JUDGE BAUMGARTNER SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT ____________________ Between: A&N SEAWAYS AND PROJECTS PVT LIMITED Claimant - and – ALLIANZ BULK CARRIERS DMCC Respondent THE MV "BHARADWAJ" ____________________ Andrew Bowen KC (instructed by Lawsmith Solicitors) for the Claimant James Lamming (instructed by MFB Solicitors) for the Respondent Hearing date: 27 June 2025 Further written submissions: 9 July 2025; 11 July 2025 ____________________ HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT APPROVED ____________________ Crown Copyright © This judgment will be handed down by the Judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and release to The National Archives. The date and time for hand down is deemed to be 10.30am on 13 August 2025. HIS HONOUR JUDGE BAUMGARTNER: Introduction There are two applications before the Court arising out of the Claimant charterer's ( "Charterers" ) challenge to an arbitration award, made by David Martin-Clark dated 9 July 2024 (the "Award" ), brought by a claim form dated 6 August 2024 (the "Claim Form" ). By the Claim Form Charterers seek to challenge the Award under s.72(2)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (the "1996 Act" ), which, read in context of the whole section, provides as follows: "(1) A person alleged to be a party to arbitral proceedings but who takes no part in the proceedings may question— (a) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, (b) whether the tribunal is properly constituted, or (c) what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement, by proceedings in the court for a declaration or injunction or other appropriate relief. (2) He also has the same right as a party to the arbitral proceedings to challenge an award— (a) by an application under section 67 on the ground of lack of substantive jurisdiction in relation to him, or (b) by an application under section 68 on the ground of serious irregularity (within the meaning of that section) affecting him; and section 70(2) (duty to exhaust arbitral procedures) does not apply in his case." Section 70(3) of the 1996 Act provides that any application or appeal against an award must be brought within 28 days of the date of the award. [1] Here, the Claim Form was filed on 6 August 2024, i.e. on the twenty-eighth day following the making of the Award and so within time. The first application is an application by Charterers dated 16 January 2025 (the "Amendment Application" ) for permission to amend the Claim Form to introduce allegations of fraud, as outlined in the draft Amended Claim Form served with the Application. The second is the Respondent owners' ( "Owners" ) strike-out application (or, in the alternative, for reverse summary judgment) (the "Strike-Out Application" ), made by Owners on 20 September 2024 pursuant to section O.8.6 of the Commercial Court Guide 2022. I heard oral argument from Andrew Bowen KC (who appears for Charterers) and James Lamming (who appears for Owners) on the Amendment Application when the two applications came before me for hearing on 27 June 2025. I refused that application, giving short reasons for so doing on the day and reserving judgment. Time did not permit for oral argument on the Strike-Out Application, but the parties agreed that I should determine that application on the papers as the rules provide, and subsequently I gave permission for Charterers to file and serve a revised consolidated skeleton argument setting out their further submissions in response, which they did on 9 July 2025. A short skeleton argument in reply was filed by Owners on 11 July 2025. This is my judgment on the two applications. The Award The Award given by Mr Martin-Clark on 9 July 2024 found that the Respondent, as the disponent owners of the MV "Bharadwaj" (the "Vessel" ), time-trip chartered the Vessel to Charterers under a fixture note and amended New York Produce Exchange time charter 1946 ( "NYPE 1946" ) form, both dated 5 July 2023 (the "Charterparty" ). He found the Charterparty contained a London-seated arbitration governed by English law. He found the Charterparty was partially performed, but that the Vessel was subsequently withdrawn on 22 September 2023 due to Charterers' non-payment of hire. At the time of withdrawal, Charterers had accrued a liability to Owners, predominantly in respect of hire and bunkers, of USD 304,912.75. Owners commenced arbitration against Charterers on 6 November 2023, and appointed Mr Martin-Clark as the Tribunal's sole arbitrator. Charterers served an "interim response" on Owners, and sought and received an extension of time in which to file submissions, but ultimately did not do so. In their interim response (the "Interim Response" ), Charterers alleged the Charterparty had been procured by fraud between Sashank Puria (one of two of Charterers' directors) and Owners, and was therefore void. The Tribunal subsequently issued a peremptory order that it would treat the Interim Response as the defence in the arbitration if no further defence was received. Owners entered a reply dealing with the various arguments put forward in the Interim Response. In particular, they said that (a) there was no fraud by Owners, nor any basis on which to allege it; (b) Mr Puria at all times had actual authority, alternatively apparent authority, to enter into the Charterparty (being just one of two directors of Charterers); and (c) in any event, the Charterparty had been affirmed by Charterers' conduct (including people other than Mr Puria) and unambiguous commitments to Owners to perform the Charterparty. The Tribunal proceeded, treating the Interim Response as Charterers' defence. It reviewed Charterers' allegations and accepted Owners' arguments, including as to affirmation. On 9 July 2024, the Tribunal made an award of USD 295,508.13. Charterers' position is that they did not take part in the arbitration proceedings, and that Owners' argument that the Tribunal was entitled to treat the Interim Response and surrounding correspondence as taking part in the proceedings is wrong. The Claim The basis for Charterers' claim as set out in the "details of claim" section of the Claim Form is as follows: "[Charterers challenge] the [Award]. The part of the [Award] challenged is the arbitrator's decision in paragraphs [34]-[38] that he had jurisdiction to determine the claim that [Owners] had presented in the reference to the arbitration. The grounds for the challenge are that the purported [Charterparty] was of no legal effect because it had been entered into by one of [Charterers'] two directors, Sashank Puria, without the authority of [Charterers]. The purported [Charterparty] was signed only by Mr Puria. There was no written resolution of [Charterers'] board of directors authorising [Charterers] to enter into the purported [Charterparty] and [Owners] would have been aware of the absence of any such resolution. [Charterers were] unaware of the actions of Mr Puria and of the purported [Charterparty] until it received a demand notice dated 10 October 2023 from [Owners]. [Charterers'] other director, James Richard Samuel, was unaware of the purported [Charterparty]. Accordingly there was no valid arbitration agreement between [Charterers] and [Owners]." The substantive allegation made against Owners in the Claim Form is that they: "would have been aware of the absence of any such resolution [ i.e. , a board resolution by Charterers authorising Mr Puria to enter the Charterparty]." The explanation for this appears to come from the witness statement of Mr Samuel (the other director of Charterers) dated 26 September 2024 ( i.e. , after the Claim Form was filed on 6 August 2024), where at paragraph 9 he says this: " It is pertinent to mention that there is no Board resolution from the [Charterers] granting authority to [Mr Puria] to make any independent decisions regarding the company's affairs, nor is there any Board resolution specifically authorizing any business dealings with the [Owners] to incur liabilities on behalf of the [Charterers]. It is further pertinent to note that there was a lack of due diligence on the part of the [Owners] when it entered the contract for the first time allegedly with the [Charterers] through [Mr Puria] and it did not also insist a Board Resolution [sic] from [Mr Puria]. These deficiencies on the part of the [Owners] give rise to concerns about the genuineness, validity and enforceability of the purported [Charterparty]. While there could have been multiple reasons for the collusion between the [Owners] and [Mr Puria] , I understand upon enquiry that the vessel was likely idling and the opportunity to defraud the [Charterers] by using the idling vessel and that too at higher than market rates had driven the [Owners] to participate in the fraud with [Mr Puria]. Therefore, the said [Charterparty] was entered into between [Mr Puria] and the [Owners] without the knowledge and/or approval of the [Charterers] but in the name of the [Charterers] with a collusive and mala fide intention to defraud the [Charterers] and enrich themselves unjustly. " No evidence was filed with the Claim Form on 6 August 2024. Rule 8.5(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (the "CPR" ) requires a claimant must file any written evidence on which he intends to rely when he files his claim form. Charterers say at that stage the allegations of fraud were not supported by a witness statement (as I mentioned, Mr Samuel's came later, dated 26 September 2024), and so the allegations were not pled. The claim was also made on the incorrect claim form (a form N208, rather than a form N8) and, notwithstanding the low quantum in dispute, the claim was commenced in the Commercial Court rather than the London Circuit Commercial Court. And, as I mentioned, the claim was made on the twenty-eighth day following the Award. All this suggests that the claim was brought hurriedly and at the very last minute. Procedural history Strike-Out Application On 20 September 2024, Owners entered a Respondent's Notice and filed a skeleton argument seeking to have the claim struck out pursuant to section O.8.6 of the Commercial Court Guide on the basis that (a) that there was no supporting evidence filed with the claim; (b) there were no sufficient particulars to which Owners could respond; (c) insofar as the claim could be made out, it had no reasonable prospect of success; and (d) Charterers had participated in the arbitration, and therefore could not challenge the Award under s.72 of the 1996 Act. On 27 September 2024, Charterers filed a short reply skeleton argument, opposing Owners' strike-out application on the basis that (a) Charterers did not participate in the reference; and (b) there was a real prospect of success on the basis of Mr Samuel's evidence, as set out in his witness statement dated 26 September 2024. They requested that they be " directed to file particulars of its claim ". Mr Samuel's witness statement, however, contained serious allegations of fraud against Owners which were not pleaded in the Claim Form and of which no material evidence had been provided, although those allegations had been foreshadowed in the Interim Response, several months earlier. Given the strict pleading requirement for allegations of fraud (see, e.g. , Sofer v Swissindependent Trustees SA [2020] EWCA Civ 699 , at [23] per Arnold LJ), Mr Samuel's witness statement attempted to set out the primary facts from which Charterers submit an inference of dishonesty could be drawn. Those primary facts are set out in paragraph 2, where Mr Samuel sets out instances that he says evidence dishonest intention, fraud, and collusion involving Owners, Mr Puria, and another party called SPG Infrastructure ( "SPG" ) said to be run by Mr Puria. These are: (a) the absence of board approval, and the fact that Charterers did not carry any cargo on the Vessel; (b) that all transactions, including financial transactions, were between Owners, Mr Puria, and SPG; (c) the Vessel was delivered to SPG, rather than to Charterers; (d) the absence of required documents, such as a local authority clearance certificate; (e) the absence of board approval for SPG's nomination for raising invoices and remittances; (f) Owners' failure to verify SPG's status, which would have disclosed that it was a partnership run by Mr Puria and not part of Charterers' group of companies; (g) the absence of an amended fixture note in the name of SPG; (h) the Owner's failure to take action against SPG; (i) the Vessel being deliberately idled, docked, anchored, or delayed for a time exceeding the stipulated time in the Charterparty; and (j) the failure to withdraw the Vessel at any earlier date in light of the non-payment of charges. On 1 October 2024, Owners responded with a short reply skeleton argument noting that any allegation of fraud had to be properly pleaded by amendment. They expressly stated that Charterers must apply to amend, and that Owners' position was reserved in circumstances where a further application would be out of time. There was subsequent correspondence between the parties about the proper way forward. Amendment Application An application to amend by Charterers was filed on 24 January 2025 (following a draft application sent to Owners on 25 November 2024), together with a supplemental witness statement from Mr Samuel dated 16 January 2025. It is useful to set out the amendment sought by Charterers to the draft amended Claim Form filed with the Amendment Application on 24 January 2025 (this largely mirrors the facts and matters averred by Mr Samuel in his witness statements): " Particulars of Dishonesty [Charterers aver] that the fraudulent bad faith alternatively dishonesty of [Owners] in entering into the [Charterparty] can be inferred from the following facts: (a) [Owners] took no steps to confirm [Charterers'] board of directors had approved the execution of the purported [Charterparty]. (b) [Owners] agreed to the nomination by Mr Puria of [SPG] alternatively amendment to the [Charterparty] to place [SPG] in place of [Charterers] without confirming the legal status of [SPG] and its relationship with [Charterers]. (c) [Owners] accepted [SPG] as the guarantor of payment. (d) The only payments made to [Owners] were made by [SPG] ; no payments were made by [Charterers]. (e) Delivery of the vessel was in fact to [SPG] because [Charterers] did not take delivery. (f) [Owners have] failed to provide proof of the valid delivery of the vessel in the form of clearance certificate from the relevant local authorities. (g) There is no record of an addendum, a new contract or amended fixture note between [Owners] and [SPG] to permit payments from [SPG] to [Owners] through outward remittances, a regulated banking process, which required an amended fixture note in [SPG's] name. (h) [Owners] did not withdraw the vessel prior to 22nd September 2023 despite the failures to pay hire charges and payment defaults. The vessel was deliberately idled, docked, anchored, or delayed for a period exceeding the time stipulated resulting in additional hire charges. (i) [Owners] took no action against [SPG] notwithstanding the agreement by SPG to pay the hire charges. Alternatively, on the basis of the same facts, [Owners were] or should have been aware that [Charterers] had not entered into the [Charterparty]. [Charterers] did not ratify the purported [Charterparty] and obtained no benefit from it because [Charterers were] entirely unaware of the existence of the [Charterparty] until 10 October 2023 and did not enter into any contracts to carry any goods on the vessel. " Notably, although the amendment is headed " Particulars of Dishonesty ", no dishonesty is averred in the details of claim given in the Claim Form; rather, the real complaint underpinning the unamended pleadings in the Claim Form is that Owners did not take any steps to confirm Mr Puria's authority to enter into the Charterparty on Charterers' behalf, or to confirm that Charterers' board of directors had approved the execution of the Charterparty. Owner's position on the Amendment Application is that the amendment should be refused for being: (1) out of time; (2) defective, as showing no ground on which fraud can be inferred; and/or (3) having no real prospects of success. Further, if the application is allowed, Owners submit the claim should be struck out because Charterers took part in the proceedings. Alternatively, if the amendment application refused, they say the original claim should be struck out both because Charterers took part in the proceedings and because the claim has no real prospects of success, or that the Claim Form is defective for want of particularisation. I take Owners' grounds in that order in dealing first with Charterers' Amendment Application. Amendment Application Out of time Legal framework Section 70(3) of the 1996 Act provides that a party challenging an award must do so within 28 days of the award. [2] This short period was imposed in order to serve the principles of speed and finality in respect of arbitration claims: see Terna Bahrain Holding Company WLL v Al Shamsi [2013] 1 Lloyd's Rep 86 , at [27], where Popplewell J (as he then was) said this: "The principles regarding extensions of time to challenge an arbitration award have been addressed in a number of recent authorities, most notably in Kalmneft v Glencore [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 128 , Nagusina Naviera v Allied Maritime Inc [2003] 2 CLC 1 , L Brown & Sons Limited v Crosby Homes (Northwest) Limited [2008] BLR 366 , Broda Agro Trading v Alfred C Toepfer International [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep 243 , and Nestor Maritime v Sea Anchor Shipping [2012] 2 Lloyd's Rep 144 , from which I derive the following principles: (1) Section 70(3) of the [1996 Act] requires challenges to an award under sections 67 and 68 to be brought within 28 days. This relatively short period of time reflects the principle of speedy finality which underpins the Act, and which is enshrined in section 1(a). The party seeking an extension must therefore show that the interests of justice require an exceptional departure from the timetable laid down by the Act. Any significant delay beyond 28 days is to be regarded as inimical to the policy of the Act. (2) The relevant factors are: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) whether the party who permitted the time limit to expire and subsequently delayed was acting reasonably in the circumstances in doing so; (iii) whether the respondent to the application or the arbitrator caused or contributed to the delay; (iv) whether the respondent to the application would by reason of the delay suffer irremediable prejudice in addition to the mere loss of time if the application were permitted to proceed; (v) whether the arbitration has continued during the period of delay and, if so, what impact on the progress of the arbitration, or the costs incurred in respect of the arbitration, the determination of the application by the Court might now have; (vi) the strength of the application; (vii) whether in the broadest sense it would be unfair to the applicant for him to be denied the opportunity of having the application determined. (3) Factors (i), (ii), and (iii) are the primary factors." The principles set out by Popplewell J quoted at [27(2)] of his judgment were ones first identified by Colman J in Kalmneft JSC v Glencore International AG [2001] 2 AER (Comm) 577, at [59] to [60], and are often referred to as the "Colman Principles". Terna was not a case about amending the particulars of claim in a claim form after the 28-day limitation period prescribed in s.70(3), but, rather, was about whether an extension of time to challenge an award under ss.67 and 68 of the 1996 Act would be permitted where the application to challenge would in any event fail. Popplewell J held the answer to that question was "no". The principles which Popplewell J set out in Terna are of direction application to where an amendment is sought outside the 28-day period from a challenge to an award under s.72(2). In addition, four matters stand out from the authorities: (1) First, the claim form as issued within 28 days must be capable of standing on its own as a " complete, particularised statement of the case to be advanced ": See section O3.2 of the Commercial Court Guide, and CPR r.62.4(1)(b). As Andrew Baker J said in Orascom TMT Investments Sàrl v VEON Limited [2018] EWHC 985 (Comm) , at [5] (my emphasis): "It is, with respect, insufficient in my judgment, although a common practice, merely to say in the Claim Form, beyond identifying the bare statutory essentials, that reference should be made to the supporting witness evidence. Witness statements served in support of a section 68 claim should contain evidence, not comment or argument. They are not the proper vehicle for setting out the analytical case to be advanced before the court; that should properly be done by way of statement of case. In circumstances where the procedure for section 68 challenges, as for that matter section 67 challenges, does not involve, unless specifically ordered in a particular case, an exchange of statements of case separate to the Claim Form, the Claim Form has to serve that purpose. " The same is true in respect of a s.72 challenge, given it is made by way of service of an N8 Claim Form. (2) Second, it must be the claimant's whole case, not merely a part thereof or a placeholder. The parties are entitled to know the specific grounds which are to be advanced in challenge to an arbitration award: see Leibinger v Stryker Trauma GmbH [2006] EWHC 690 (Comm) , at [31] to [33] per Cooke J. (3) Third, evidence must be contained in the arbitration claim or filed at the same time: CPR r.8.5(1), (7). No written evidence may be relied on at the hearing of the claim unless it has been served in accordance with this rule, or the court gives permission: CPR r.8.6(1). (4) Fourth, any allegations of fraud must be pleaded squarely and fairly, not in a mealy-mouthed way. This is not a requirement specific to arbitration claims but applies more widely: see Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1 , per Lord Millett at [184] et seq .; and JSC Bank of Moscow v Kekhman [2015] EWHC 3073 (Comm) , per Flaux J (as he then was) at [20]. In Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro SpA [2018] EWCA Civ 2025 , Sales LJ (with whom Gloster LJ agreed) said this (at [46]): "The pleading of fraud or deceit is a serious step, with significance and reputational ramifications going well beyond the pleading of a claim in negligence. Courts regard it as improper, and can react very adversely, where speculative claims in fraud are bandied about by a party to litigation without a solid foundation in the evidence. A party risks the loss of its fund of goodwill and confidence on the part of the court if it makes an allegation of fraud which the court regards as unjustified, and this may affect the court's reaction to other parts of its case. Moreover, as Birss J observed in Property Alliance Group v Royal Bank of Scotland [2015] EWHC 3272 (Ch) at [40], allegations of fraud 'can cause a major increase in the cost, complexity and temperature of an action.' For these reasons parties are well-advised, and indeed enjoined according to usual pleading principles, to be reticent before pleading fraud or deceit." Where a party wishes to adduce a fresh ground of challenge after the expiry of the s.70(3) 28 days, two authorities set out the approach to be adopted. The first is the decision of Cooke J in Leibinger , to which I have already referred; the second is the decision of Field J in Konkola Copper Mines plc v U&M Mining Zambia Ltd [2014] EWHC 2210 (Comm). Leibinger concerned an out-of-time application to amend a s.67 application. The claim form had been served within the 28-day period, but noted on its face that further particulars and witness evidence would follow. Well after the expiry of the 28-day period, the claimant sought to provide particulars, including a ground not contained in the claim form at all. The respondent objected; the claimant applied to file and serve detailed particulars and written evidence 72 days after the statutory 28-day deadline. Cooke J refused permission. At [31], he held (my emphasis): "As the defendant points out, the claimants seek to undermine and circumvent the statutory time limits provided by Section 70(3) of the 1996 Act by issuing a Claim Form without detailed particulars and without evidence and then making an application to file and serve detailed particulars and written evidence 72 days after the statutory deadline , after serving those particulars and evidence some eight weeks after that deadline. These are not short periods in the context of the 28 day period allowed by statute. The public policy which underlies arbitration and the finality of awards means that extensions of time, particularly on a retrospective basis, are not lightly given. Section 73(2) of the 1996 Act provides that where an arbitral tribunal decides that it has jurisdiction and a party who could have questioned that ruling by challenging the award does not do so within the time allowed by the statute, 'he may not object later to the tribunal substantive jurisdiction on any ground which was the subject of that ruling'. Whilst this is not a case where the Claim Form was issued out of time (as in Kalmneft JSC v Glencore International AG [2001] 2 AER (Comm) 577), the principles to be applied are not dissimilar as appears from the decision of Colman J in Westland Helicopters Limited v Sheikh Salah al-Hejailan (1) [2004] 2 LLR 523 at paragraphs 38-42." Konkola contained a pattern of facts similar to a s.68 challenge. The claim form was filed within the statutory period. It was itself defective because it referred only to the grounds contained in two witness statements. Some 81 days after the award was published ( i.e. , 53 days out of time), the claimant served further witness evidence alleging fresh and previously unpleaded irregularities. The respondent objected; the claimant applied to amend. Field J rejected the application, applying the Colman Principles (see [?25] above). At [18], the learned judge said this (my emphasis): "The parties are entitled to know the specific grounds which are to be advanced in challenge to an arbitration award not only because they must know the case to be met but also because they should know the extent to which what would otherwise be a valid award is challenged. One of the objectives of arbitral proceedings is to achieve the speedy determination of disputes. It is accordingly very important that time requirements prescribed by the Act are strictly complied with and only allowed to be departed from in exceptional cases. No reasonable excuse has been proffered to the court for the failure to plead the grounds now sought to be introduced at the time the Arbitration Claim Form was issued ." As Popplewell J said in Terna (at [27(3)]), the three most important of the Colman Principles are: (1) the length of the delay: this is to be "judged against the yardstick of the 28 days provided for in the Act" (at [28]); (2) whether the delay was reasonable: this requires an investigation into the reasons for the delay, and the onus is on the applicant to provide an explanation (at [29]) (my emphasis): "In the absence of such explanation, the Court will give little weight to counsel's arguments that the evidence discloses potential reasons for delay and that the applicant 'would have assumed' this or 'would have thought' that. It will not normally be legitimate, for example, for counsel to argue that an applicant was unaware of the time limit if he has not said so, expressly or by necessary implication, in his evidence. Moreover where the evidence is consistent with laxity, incompetence or honest mistake on the one hand, and a deliberate informed choice on the other, an applicant's failure to adduce evidence that the true explanation is the former can legitimately give rise to the inference that it is the latter. "; and (3) whether the respondent or the arbitrator caused or contributed to the delay. Discussion and analysis Was Charterers' delay lengthy? In my judgment, it was. The Claim Form was issued on 6 August 2024; the Amendment Application was only issued on 15 January 2025 (and a draft of it only sent to Owners' solicitors on 25 November 2024). That is a delay of some five months relative to the 28-day statutory limit for challenging the Award (or three months until the date on which it was provided in draft form to Owners). I cannot accept Mr Bowen KC's submission that Owners waived their right to argue the amended claim is out of time. While the Claim Form referred to an alleged lack of authority on Mr Puria's part to enter into the Charterparty, it does not allege fraud. The first intimation of fraud is found only in Mr Samuel's witness statement dated 26 September 2024 – some 50 days after the Claim Form was filed on 6 August 2024 – at paragraph 9, where he says Owners' failure to insist on a board resolution from Charterers granting authority to Mr Puria to enter into the Charterparty: " give rise to concerns about the genuineness, validity and enforceability of the purported [Charterparty]. While there could have been multiple reasons for the collusion between the [Owners] and [Mr Puria] , I understand upon enquiry that the vessel was likely idling and the opportunity to defraud the [Charterers] by using the idling vessel and that too at higher than market rates had driven the [Owners] to participate in the fraud with [Mr Puria]. Therefore, the said [Charterparty] was entered into between [Mr Puria] and the [Owners] without the knowledge and/or approval of the [Charterers] but in the name of the [Charterers] with a collusive and mala fide intention to defraud the [Charterers] and enrich themselves unjustly. " As I mentioned at [?13] above, no evidence was filed by Charterers with the Claim Form on 6 August 2024. The fact that Owners were later served with Mr Samuel's witness statement does not, in and of itself, amount to a waiver on their part. Charterers could not force an election by so doing. Was the delay reasonable? It is not suggested that any of the facts and matters (or even the speculation) now set out in Mr Samuel's witness statement and relied upon by Charterers were (or was) not able to be given by Mr Samuel at the time the Claim Form was issued. Even though the burden is on Charterers, no reason has been offered for their failure to plead the fraud allegations from the outset. A remarkable feature of Charterers' application is that no witness statement by their solicitors has been offered to explain the reasons why this allegation was not pleaded from the very outset. Mr Samuel offers no explanation why. Mr Bowen KC argued (at [2] of his skeleton argument) that, " At that stage allegations of fraud were not supported by a witness statement and were accordingly not pled ", but (a) counsel cannot give evidence; (b) there is no explanation why a witness statement was not provided in accordance with CPR r.8.5(1) together with the Claim Form; and (c) it is not a prerequisite to pleading fraud that a witness statement be filed alongside it, it requires only clear instructions and reasonably credible material to establish an arguable case: see the Bar Standards Board Handbook (v.4.8), Part 2: Code of Conduct, r.C9, which provides (in relevant part, and my emphasis): " Your duty to act with honesty and with integrity under CD3 includes the following requirements: . 2 you must not draft any statement of case, witness statement, affidavit or other document containing: . a any statement of fact or contention which is not supported by your client or by your instructions; . b any contention which you do not consider to be properly arguable; . c any allegation of fraud, unless you have clear instructions to allege fraud and you have reasonably credible material which establishes an arguable case of fraud; . d (in the case of a witness statement or affidavit) any statement of fact other than the evidence which you reasonably believe the witness would give if the witness were giving evidence orally; … " If the absence of evidence filed within the statutory period was reasonable, then the applications in Leibinger and Konkola should have been allowed. They were not. And, in any event, the regulator's requirement that fraud be pleaded only in the circumstances set out (here, by the Bar Standards Board (the "BSB" ) at r.C9.2.c) is not a minor or technical pleading point: allegations of fraud stand apart from other allegations and are expressly regulated by, amongst others, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the BSB, and the Commercial Court Guide, which provides at C.1.3(c): "(i) Full and specific details should be given of any allegation of fraud, dishonesty, malice or illegality; and (ii) where an inference of fraud or dishonesty is alleged, the facts on the basis of which the inference is alleged must be fully set out." It is not for Owners to try and guess whether these allegations of fraud were ones that were being made by Charterers in the Claim Form. The sole basis for Mr Samuel alleging fraud is what he says was Owners' failure to insist on a board resolution from Charterers granting authority to Mr Puria to enter into the Charterparty. That, coupled with the other facts and matters upon which he relies to make out a case for fraud is, with respect, and in my judgment, insufficient to establish an arguable case of fraud. I return to this aspect below in considering Charterers' prospect of success. That aside, I see no good reason why the allegations were not pleaded in the Claim Form together with supporting evidence: the very same allegations now set out in the draft amended Claim Form (and in Mr Samuel's witness statement dated 26 September 2024) are materially identical to those set out by Charterers in their Interim Response in the arbitration in February 2024. Indeed, they appear to be materially identical to the various police reports filed by Charterers on 2 November 2023, 21 December 2023, and 7 March 2024. Further, Charterers did not act promptly to seek to amend their pleadings even after it was made clear by Owners that they had to do so: Charterers had been on notice from Owners since 1 October 2024 that (a) their pleading was deficient; (b) an application to amend was necessary; and (c) Owners' position was reserved. Was the delay caused or contributed to by Owners? I do not think so. By their first skeleton argument dated 20 September 2024, Owners applied for the claim to be struck out. It suggested that, in the alternative, the Court direct Charterers to amend the Claim Form and serve witness evidence (subject, of course, to Charterers obtaining the Court's permission to do so). By their skeleton dated 27 September 2024, Charterers opposed Owners' strike-out on the basis of Mr Samuel's witness statement and requested that they be directed to file particulars of claim. As Mr Samuel's witness statement contained allegations of fraud upon which Charterers relied, they had to be pleaded. They were not. Owners' skeleton dated 1 October 2024 noted the new allegations of fraud had not been pleaded. It said: " Insofar as the Claimant wishes to provide proper particulars, it must apply to amend its Claim Form. The Respondent's position on that, in particular in circumstances where a further application would be out of time, is reserved ". So, in all, I do not think it can justifiably be said that the delay was caused or contributed to by Owners. Permission to amend is therefore refused on this ground. Defective, as showing no ground on which fraud can be inferred Legal framework For fraud to be pleaded, the primary facts as pleaded, if true, must render "an inference of dishonesty is more likely than one of innocence or negligence"; there must be some fact which "tilts the balance and justifies an inference of dishonesty": see JSC Bank , per Flaux J (reviewing the authorities) at [20]. In Jinxin Inc v Aser Media Pte Ltd [2022] EWHC 2988 (Comm) , Peter MacDonald Eggers KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) held that, in order to justify a plea of fraud, the inference of dishonesty or fraud must be more likely than not, having regard to the primary facts pleaded. He went on to say this: "That all said, there remains some flexibility in allowing an element of freedom to a claimant alleging fraud to plead its case with the evidence and information then available, given that there might be concerns that the evidence against the defendant will not be readily available, at least possibly until disclosure and the exchange of evidence." Discussion and analysis That test is not met here. As Mr Lamming submitted before me, the facts as pleaded in Charterers' draft amended Claim Form lack coherence and are all more consistent with honesty on Owners' part than dishonesty for the following reasons. Mr Samuel's primary point is that Owners did not take any steps to confirm Mr Puria's authority to enter into the Charterparty on Charterers' behalf, or to confirm that Charterers' board of directors had approved the execution of the Charterparty. Suyash Lalwani, Owners' director of chartering, sets out at paragraph 10 in his witness statement dated 5 May 2025 that this would have been an unusual and unnecessary step to take: " … it is not normal business practice to request to see board approval; indeed it would be highly unusual. … I do not consider that any lack of board approval would be relevant in any event, and consider that we were entitled to rely on Mr Puria, as a director of [Charterers] (a company with only 2 directors), when entering into the contract. " Mr Puria used the company stamp when entering into the Charterparty (he instructed "accounts@anseaways.com" to affix the stamp and send, which was promptly done), and he communicated extensively with email addresses using Charterers' domain name "anseaways.com", with Charterers' finance director copied. There is nothing produced by Charterers in evidence to show that Mr Puria was not authorised to enter the Charterparty. Mr Samuel also relies upon the position and role of SPG (which I set out at [?17] above), though it is not immediately clear to me how this supports an allegation of fraud. The suggestion that the Charterparty was novated such that SPG replaced Charterers as the contracting party is not borne out by the contemporaneous documentary evidence, such as Charterers' letter at p.405 of the bundle. In any event, even if the Charterparty had been novated to SPG, no claim could have been pursued by Owners against Charterers, and so I do not see how it supports Charterers' allegations of fraud. There are other peculiarities with the pleadings advanced by Charterers in the draft amended Claim Form. It is unclear what "guarantee" is referred to in paragraph (c), or how it is different from the fact that SPG in fact made payment (which is common ground). Mr Samuel does not address it in his witness statements dated 26 September 2024 and 16 January 2025. I cannot see how it would support a pleading of fraud in any event. As for the other "particulars of dishonesty", they too lack coherence: (1) in paragraph (d), which avers the only payments made to Owners were made by SPG, and no payments were made by Charterers. It is common ground that the hire payments made came from SPG, but there may well be many reasons why Owners could regard such an arrangement as unremarkable. Whatever arrangements Charterers and SPG had between themselves was a matter between them. Ultimately, Owners' contract was with Charterers, and it was to Charterers to whom they could (and did) look in the event payment from SPG was not forthcoming; (2) in paragraphs (e) and (f), which aver delivery of the vessel was to SPG not Charterers, and the lack of a clearance certificate. Permission to charter the Vessel, however, was applied for and given by the Directorate General of Shipping, Mumbai, to Charterers, as the clearance certificate at p.1,270 of the bundle shows; (3) in paragraph (g), which avers the lack of any documented agreement between Owners and SPG to permit payments from SPG to Owners. I do not understand the basis for or relevance of this pleading. Who would have required an amended fixture note? Why this would have been required? Neither of Mr Samuel's witness statements address these issues; (4) in paragraph (i), which avers Owners took no action against SPG notwithstanding the agreement by SPG to pay the hire charges. Again, I cannot see how this supports a pleading of fraud. Owners pursued Charterers because Charterers were their contractual counterparty. As I have said, whatever arrangement Charterers had with SPG was a matter between them. Lastly, Charterers seek to aver the Charterparty was of an unusually long length and that this is somehow indicative of fraud. I do not see how that is so. The Charterparty was a trip-time charterparty of " 02 TO 03 LL (25 DAYS MIN BASIS) ", or two to three laden legs, with a basis period of 25 days minimum (see p.72 of the bundle). It was not, as Mr Samuel suggests at paragraph 2(L) in his witness statement dated 16 January 2025, a time charter of 30 days, plus or minus 5 days: although this was a term preprinted in the NYPE 1946 form, the terms of the recap overtook this. Voyage charterparties can, in any event, overrun or, in the case of trip-time charters, simply to be extended by consent, e.g. , where a vessel is laden, and it would be highly inconvenient for owners to terminate the charterparty and become bailees of the goods). The Vessel was in fact withdrawn from Charterers' service on 22 September 2023. The causes given for this delay were various: Charterers' failure to arrange for the Vessel's discharge; Charterers' failure to supply bunkers; and Charterers' failure to pay hire, which led Owners to stop in international waters awaiting payment of hire on 3 August 2023 and 8 August 2023. For all those reasons I consider Charterers' draft amendments defective, in that they show no grounds on which fraud could be inferred. Permission to amend is refused on this ground too. No real prospect of success Legal framework A requirement for permission to amend is that any claim raised in a pleaded amendment must have a real prospect of success, which is the same test as applies on a summary judgment application; see CNM Estates (Tolworth Tower) Ltd v Carvill-Biggs [2023] 1 WLR 4335 , at [48] to [49], where Males LJ (who agreed with Sir Geoffrey Vos MR and Newey LJ on this aspect) said this: "48. … There is no point in giving permission for an amendment which is fanciful and which has no real prospect of success. In this regard the principal focus must be on the pleading in question and no attempt should be made to resolve disputed matters of evidence (conducting a mini-trial) … . It is, however, appropriate to consider whether a proposed pleading is coherent and contains properly particularised elements of the cause of action relied upon ( Elite Property Holdings Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [2019] EWCA Civ 204 at [42]). 49. Even if an amendment clears that initial hurdle and has a real prospect of success, whether to allow the amendment remains a matter of discretion. I would accept, however, that in general (and save perhaps in the case of 'very late' amendments) it is not appropriate to consider the strength or weakness of the claim as a factor relevant to that exercise of discretion, for the reasons given by the Master of the Rolls and Lord Justice Newey at [69] to [77] of their judgment. Discussion and analysis As I found on the last ground, there is no such prospect of Charterers proving fraud on the basis of the facts pleaded in the draft amended Claim Form: in my judgment, the facts sought to be pleaded lack coherence and do not justify an inference of fraud. On the papers placed before me, it seems to me that, in reliance on Mr Puria's actual (alternatively, apparent) authority, Owners and Charterers entered into a Charterparty. Mr Puria was one of only two company directors. He used the company stamp to certify the Charterparty. He used his email address "sashank@anseaways.com" in communications. He instructed the email address "accounts@anseaways.com" to affix the stamp, which was done. The Charterparty was subsequently performed. Throughout the course of the Charterparty communications took place between Owners and Charterers, with Mr Puria, and with "chartering@anseaways.com" (Ashmi Parveen, an employee of Charterers who was "Manager Chartering") and "accounts@anseways.com". Charterers paid late and inconvenienced Owners on several occasions. Owners sought frequently to make Charterers pay the hire outstanding until eventually they ran out of patience and withdrew the Vessel. I do not understand what benefit Owners would hope to gain by entering into the fraud alleged. They have now spent significant time and funds trying to enforce against a relatively small outstanding hire debt. Permission to amend is refused on this ground too. Conclusion It is for all those reasons that I refused Charterers' Amendment Application. Their claim as pleaded stands in the Claim Form dated 6 August 2024. I turn on that basis to consider Owners' Strike-Out Application. Strike-Out Application Legal framework The legal framework on strike-out applications (otherwise known as reverse summary judgment applications) is the same as that which applies on summary judgment applications which I set out above. Claims which are fanciful and which have no real prospect of success ought to be struck out. CPR r.3.4(2)(a) provides that the court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim. As Master Marsh said in MF Tel Sarl v Visa Europe Ltd [2023] EWHC 1336 (Ch) , at [32]: "The test under CPR rule 3.4(2)(a) requires the court to be satisfied that the claim is 'unwinnable' where continuance of the claim is without any possible benefit to the respondent and would waste resources on both sides. … This sets a high hurdle for an applicant seeking to strike out a statement of case. There are some circumstances in which the applicant may not succeed in striking out a claim that is 'bound to fail' where the relevant area of law is subject to some uncertainty and is developing such that it is desirable that the facts should be found at a trial so that any further development of the law should be on the basis of actual and not hypothetical facts." Owners oppose Charterers' claim under s.72(2)(a) of the 1996 Act and section O.8.6 of the Commercial Court Guide on two separate bases: first, Charterers' participation in the arbitral proceedings which led to the Award, and, second, the claim has no real prospect of success. Section O.8.6 of the Commercial Court Guide provides: "The Court has power under rule 3.3(4) and/or rule 23.8(c) to dismiss any claim without a hearing. It is astute to do so in the case of challenges to awards under section 67 or 68 of the Act where the nature of the challenge or the evidence filed in support of it leads the Court to consider that the claim has no real prospect of success. If a respondent to such a challenge considers that the case is one in which the Court should dismiss the claim on that basis: (a) the respondent should file a respondent's notice to that effect, together with a skeleton argument (not exceeding 15 pages) and any evidence relied upon, within 21 days of service of the proceedings on it; (b) the applicant may file a skeleton and/or evidence in reply within 7 days of service of the respondent's notice." While the Commercial Court Guide specifically refers to challenges under s.67 or s.68 of the 1996 Act as amenable to such applications, I see no reason why the Court should not exercise its power under the same procedure in respect of a s.72 claim where it would exercise its power in respect of a s.67 challenge. The power is, in any event, based on the Court's power under CPR r.3.3(4) and r.23.8(c) (which provides that the court may deal with an application without a hearing if it does not consider that a hearing would be appropriate). Charterers' participation in the arbitral proceedings It is a condition of a challenge under s.72 of the 1996 Act that a party "takes no part in the proceedings". In Sovarex SA v Romero Alvarez SA [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep 325, Hamblen J (as he then was, reviewing the authorities) said (my emphasis): "23. The cases therefore draw a distinction between protesting that the arbitration tribunal has no jurisdiction and asserting that the issue should be decided by some other court or tribunal and asking the tribunal to consider the issue of jurisdiction. In the latter case the party is likely to be held to have invoked the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 24. Sovarex sought to rely upon the obiter comment made in Broda Agro v Alfred C Toepfer [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep 243 at 250, at [50] (Stanley Burnton LJ), where he said: 'It may be difficult to distinguish between a letter that does no more than inform the arbitral tribunal, as a matter of courtesy, that the respondent does not accept its jurisdiction, and a submission that it has no jurisdiction. This is such a case.' 25. … A 'submission' that the tribunal has no jurisdiction is made when you invite the tribunal to consider that issue and thereby invoke their jurisdiction to decide it." The position is as stated in Merkin and Flannery ( op. cit. ), at 72.2.1: "A party cannot have its cake and eat it: it must really elect at the outset to snub the process entirely, or to engage, and if the latter, any engagement at all will cost that party the right to apply under section 72." Whether a party "takes no part in the proceedings" will all depend on the exact circumstances, and the correct interpretation of any such letter will depend upon the precise words used and the context in which they have been used. Discussion and analysis Mr Bowen KC submits that, in corresponding with the Tribunal, Charterers did no more than make clear that they were protesting the Tribunal's jurisdiction and asserting that Owners should withdraw their notice of arbitration. He submits that, in doing so, Charterers did not recognise that the Tribunal had jurisdiction, nor did they invite the Tribunal to consider or determine the issue. That correspondence was directed at explaining why Charterers were not going to participate in the arbitration, not at inviting any jurisdiction to be exercised. He submits that Charterers did not participate in the constitution of the Tribunal. Mr Bowen KC took me to the following correspondence from Charterers' solicitors to Owners' solicitors to make good his point: (1) on 22 November 2023: " Please note that the appointment of arbitrator by your client to commence the arbitral proceedings is illegal since our client disputes the existence of the alleged Charter Party dated July 05, 2023 stated to have been executed by our client … Kindly advise your client to forthwith withdraw the initiation of arbitration under the alleged Charter Party "; (2) on 13 February 2024: " The Sole Arbitrator was unilaterally nominated and wrongly declared as appointed at the instance of the Claimant without considering the responses sent by us on behalf of our client on October 26, 2023 and November 22, 2023. In the said responses, our client disputed the very existence of the purported Charter Party and called upon your client to forbear from initiating any arbitral proceedings. We once again reiterate our objections to the purported and wrongful constitution of the present Arbitral Tribunal which lacks jurisdiction over the alleged dispute between the Claimant and our client since the subject matter is non arbitrable for the reasons stated and reiterated below Therefore, in light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there is no valid dispute for the present Arbitral Tribunal to decide. The jurisdiction of the present Arbitral Tribunal is challenged and disputed as the subject matter is non-arbitrable and non-maintainable as against our client "; and (3) on 26 February 2024: " Therefore, our client requires three-week time extension to prepare and submit appropriate submissions/application before Mr. David Martin Clark, the Sole Arbitrator based on the opinion that our client procures from the counsel in London. " All this, Mr Bowen submits, was clearly a continuance of Charterers' protest that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction. He says it is significant to note that the arbitrator did not consider Charterers had taken part in the proceedings, because at [34] of the Award he says: " As the Charterers have chosen not to participate in this reference … ". Mr Lamming seeks to persuade me otherwise. He says Charterers did not "take no part" in the proceedings, and its s.72 claim therefore fails. Mr Lamming submits Charterers provided the Interim Response in reply to Owners' claim submissions, and confirmed that it was content for the Interim Response to be put before the Tribunal in reply to Owners' request that Charterers confirm that these were intended to constitute submissions (albeit without any submission thereby to the jurisdiction). On 16 February 2024, Owners' solicitors wrote to Charterers' solicitors, saying (my emphasis): " 1. We refer to your below interim response to the claim submissions of 17 January. We note that your clients deny liability and contest jurisdiction. 2. The next step is to inform the appointed arbitrator of the parties' respective positions, including your clients' jurisdictional challenge. As such we will write to the arbitrator with you in copy. Before we send that message, we have noted that your interim response is marked 'without prejudice'. We understand that to be a general reservation of all your clients' rights, including as to jurisdiction rather than an assertion of privilege over the contents of your clients' response to the claim submissions … For the sake of good order, could you please confirm within Monday 19 February 2024, 4pm London to me, that your interim response is precisely that and is for submission to the Tribunal. We will write to the Tribunal after the aforementioned time and so look forward to your confirmation by then. " Charterers' solicitors replied the following day, saying (my emphasis): " Your understanding is correct as to the reservation of our rights regarding the arbitrability of the captioned dispute. We object to the initiation of arbitration proceedings itself including the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator by you. We reserve all our rights to challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. Please note that we have no objections in forwarding the interim response dated February 13, 2024 by you to Mr. David Martin-Clark, however, the same does not amount to our client's acceptance to submit itself to the arbitration proceedings initiated by you. " Mr Lamming says the Tribunal was entitled to and did consider Charterers' Interim Response to be Charterers' defence in the absence of anything further served. Once this step had been taken, the onus was properly on Charterers to notify the Tribunal that their Interim Response was not in fact a defence and should not have been considered as such. Allowing the Tribunal to treat the Interim Response as a defence meant that Charterers did in fact have their cake (which they now seek by means of this claim also to eat): their numbered legal submissions were placed before the Tribunal and considered. Further, Mr Lamming says Charterers' solicitors in fact expressly sought a three-week extension from the Tribunal in order to serve Charterers' submissions or application in response to Owners' own application. He says this application can only be understood as taking part in the proceedings, including an avowed intention to " submit appropriate submissions/application before Mr. David Martin Clark ". Once this application for an extension had been made and granted, Mr Lamming submits it was no longer open to Charterers to resile silently or at all from its participation in the hearing. It may well have been Charterers' intention not to take part in the proceedings, but I consider that is what they in fact did. Having carefully considered the correspondence passing between Owners' solicitors and Charterers' solicitors, with Mr Martin-Clark being copied at times and him replying to all in giving directions for the conduct of the reference, it seems to me that Charterers' application for an extension of time prejudiced Owners' position to proceed with the reference and to enforce an award. As the learned authors of Merkin and Flannery say, Charterers were faced at the very outset to elect to snub the proceedings entirely, or to engage. Seeking an extension was, in my judgment, engaging in the arbitral process because it was an implicit acknowledgement of the process and inconsistent with the reservation of rights previously expressed. As to Mr Martin-Clark's observation that Charterers had chosen not to participate in the reference, that accorded with what transpired insofar as the proceedings were concerned, but it did not reflect what Charterers' solicitors did by taking part in the proceedings in seeking an extension of time. To my mind, "participating in" and "taking part in" the proceedings are two very different things. By seeking the extension which they did, Charterers took part in the proceedings even though they may not have participated in the proceedings in the way in which Mr Martin-Clark meant: they did not engage in the proceedings other than permitting their Interim Response to be provided to him while they sought an extension of time pending English legal advice. This followed an application by Owners for an order that Charterers either serve the standard defence submissions or confirm that their Interim Response stood as such. In reply, Mr Martin-Clark sent a message to Charterers requiring them, if they wished to reply to the Owners' application, to do so within that week. Their solicitors replied, saying : " Our client is currently in the process of obtaining a legal opinion from counsel in London. Therefore, our client requires three-week time extension to prepare and submit appropriate submissions/application before Mr. David Martin Clark, the Sole Arbitrator based on the opinion that our client procures from the counsel in London. " The extension was granted by Mr Martin-Clark's order of 6 March 2024. The need to obtain Mr Martin-Clark's leave to do so was inconsistent with Charterers' earlier reservations. They took part in the proceedings. It follows that Charterers' application under s.72(2)(a) must fail and their be claim struck out accordingly. No real prospect of success Discussion and analysis As permission to amend has not been granted, Mr Lamming submits Charterers' claim should be struck out on the basis that it has no real prospect of success pursuant to CPR rr.3.3(4), 3.4(2)(a), 23.8(c), and/or section O.8.7 of the Commercial Court Guide. I accept that submission. Charterers must try to make good their pleaded case in the Claim Form without any allegation of dishonesty, solely on the basis that Mr Puria did not have authority to bind Charterers and no ratification of the Charterparty occurred. Mr Bowen KC submits that, in the event the Amendment Application is refused, the unamended claim set out in the Claim Form should not be struck out because it is sufficiently particularised and discloses a claim that has a real prospect of success. That submission requires a careful analysis of the cause of action and the evidence which remains outwith the draft amended Claim Form and Mr Samuel's witness statement of 26 September 2024, filed in support of the Amendment Application and after the Claim Form was filed on 6 August 2024. As I mentioned at [?14] above, CPR r.8.5(1) requires a claimant must file any written evidence on which he intends to rely when he files his claim form. Charterers did not. They have not sought permission to rely on Mr Samuel's two witness statements filed thereafter. No evidence was filed in support of the claim until Mr Samuel's witness statement dated 26 September 2024. Even if Mr Samuel's evidence was admitted by the Court and accepted in its entirety at trial, at its highest all it would establish is that: (a) Charterers were unaware of Mr Puria's actions and the Charterparty until they received Owners' demand notice; (b) Mr Puria did not have Charterers' actual authority; (c) Owners were aware or should have been aware Mr Puria did not have authority; and (d) Charterers (rather than SPG) did not ratify the Charterparty and did not obtain any benefit from it. I do not consider the details of claim pleaded in the Claim Form to be sufficiently particularised for Owners to respond: see Khosravi v British American Tobacco Plc [2016] EWHC 123 (QB) , where Sir David Eady (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) held that a claim form and particulars so lacking in particularity as to be hopelessly vague and uninformative would be struck out. Here, Charterers have failed to provide evidence on which they sought to rely at the time (and therefore now require permission) and, in any event, the allegations made in Mr Samuel's witness statement dated 26 September 2024 go on to claims of fraud. No explanation – save for fraud – is given in the Claim Form for why Owners "would have been aware of the absence of any such resolution". In my judgment, the Tribunal was right to conclude that Mr Puria at all times had at least apparent authority to enter into the Charterparty, taking into account the use of the company stamp, the fact that Mr Puria was one of only two directors, the use of his company email address (including company email addresses other than his own in copy), the communication of other employees of Charterers, and the Mumbai Port authorisation obtained in the name of Charterers. Even if Charterers succeeded in showing that Mr Puria did not have apparent authority, there is no prospect of the Court doing anything other than holding, as the Tribunal did, that the Charterparty had been affirmed by Charterers' (including people other than Mr Puria) various unambiguous commitments to Owners to perform the Charterparty after its entry into force. The test for affirmation is an objective one: see Suncorp Insurance and Finance Co Ltd v Milano Assicurazioni SpA [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 225; and Chitty on Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, 35th ed., 2024) at 22-033. Here it was plainly met. Taking all those matters in the round, Charterers' claim as set out in the unamended Claim Form has no real prosect of success. It must be struck out. Disposition For all those reasons, Charterers' Amendment Application is dismissed, and their claim is struck out pursuant to CPR rr.3.3(4), 3.4(2)(a), 23/8(c), and/or section O.8.7 of the Commercial Court Guide. I will make orders accordingly. Charterers must pay Owners' costs of and incidental to these two applications and the claim. Mr Lamming submits those costs should be paid on an indemnity basis pursuant to CPR r.44.4(1)(b), applying the principles set out by Miles J in Libyan Investment Authority v King [2023] EWHC 434 (Ch) , at [11] to [20]. Before setting out and considering those principles, Miles J said this (at [10]): "… the failure of a case of fraud or dishonesty is a factor that the court may take into account in deciding on the basis of assessment but there is no automatic or rule that the making of such allegations which fail at trial will justify an order for indemnity costs or even operate as a starting point in the sense that the paying party is then required to explain why indemnity costs are not appropriate. It is also right to recall that the default position is that standard costs are to be paid unless the court orders otherwise." I bear those cautionary words in mind. Applying the factors set out by Miles J to this case: (1) The Claim Form was filed without evidence of any kind and without sufficient particularisation, in breach of CPR r.8.5. No explanation was provided for this failure. Charterers instead sought to provide Mr Samuel's witness statement dated 26 September 2024 by way of reply evidence to Owners' Strike-Out Application, which was a waste of resource and costs. All that Mr Samuel had to say in his first witness statement could have been said by him when the Claim Form was issued on 6 August 2024, but it was not. (2) The Amendment Application was (to use Miles J's words) "speculative, weak, opportunistic [and] thin": given no evidence was adduced (until the last-minute attempt) to explain the failure, I consider it was in fact a completely hopeless application. That is why I disposed of it at the hearing on 27 June 2025, giving an ex tempore judgment setting out in short my reasons so doing. (3) Charterers advanced and aggressively pursued serious and wide-ranging allegations of dishonesty and impropriety in witness evidence. They were, in my judgment, entirely speculative. If Charterers had any complaint about the limit and extent of Mr Puria's authority as one of their two directors, they should have pursued him, not Owners. (4) Despite the ex tempore judgment which I gave at the hearing that refusing to plead the allegations of fraud, Charterers sought to re-introduce those allegations in their further submissions in response to the Strike-Out Application. (5) The allegations of fraud (and indeed the allegation of lack of apparent authority) are, for the reasons which I set out above, hopeless. I am satisfied that Owners entered the Charterparty in good faith and with the due diligence that was commercially reasonable in the circumstances. For that, they cannot be faulted in the way in which Charterers sought to do so. Having considered the factors set out by Miles J in King , and bearing in mind the default position is that standard costs are to be paid unless the court orders otherwise, I can see no good or sufficient reason why Charterers should not pay Owners' costs on the indemnity basis sought by Mr Lamming. I will order they do so, to be assessed if not agreed. Note 1   See Russell on Arbitration (Informa Law, 24th ed., 2015), at 8-061: “ Sections 67-69 are available to ‘a party to arbitral proceedings’. This refers to a person who takes part or continues to take part in the arbitration. [ The phrase ‘a party to arbitral proceedings’ is also used in ss.24(1), 32, 36, 43(1), 73(2). ] Such a person is to be contrasted with a person ‘alleged to be a party to arbitral proceedings but who takes no part’ under s.72(1). [ London Steam Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain [2013] EWHC 2840 (Comm) at [82(3)]; Bernuth Lines Ltd v High Seas Shipping Ltd [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 359 at [51]. ] Such non-participants are however given the right to challenge an award under ss.67 and 68, but not s.69, by virtue of s.72(2). By s.82(2) of the Act, a party includes any person claiming under or through an arbitration agreement .” As the learned authors of Merkin and Flannery on the Arbitration Act 1996 (Informa Law, 6th ed., 2019), observe (at 72.5): “ as the words in section 72(2) refer to an applicant having ‘the same right’ as a party challenging an award under either section 67 or 68 (which implicitly includes the time limit in section 70(3)). By the express inclusion of the words ‘section 70(2) … does not apply’, the obvious inference is that the time limit in section 70(3) does apply .” [Back] Note 2   See fn. 1, above. 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